A mysterious document from a mysterious source has accused the Ghana Armed Forces and indeed the government of the NDC and individuals close to Flt. Lt. Rawlings of high corruption in military procurement.

In a letter to The Accra Mail received last year, the author of the unsigned document said he was sending the documents to The Accra Mail because he had read the newspaper's internet version and "they do not sound to me like Ghana government propaganda." Whilst unable to vouch for its authenticity, we are presenting it in full in the public interest. We are also by this publication calling on the appropriate agencies with the resources to investigate the accusations fully because as the saying goes, "there is no smoke without fire."

The document is couched in the halting English of a German who does not have much English and so readers would have to read a little more carefully and do their own editing to get the full meaning of the allegations.

Dated 2nd December 1999, they were originally addressed to Ghana's military attache at the Ghana High Commission in London. The author of the document is quite categorical in making allegations against one Lt. Col. Timothy Mbro Barnes and one Col. W.A. Gbedemah of being in collusion with Mercedes-Benz to cheat the Republic of Ghana.

The Accra Mail has learnt from Burma Camp sources that when the election results were declared in early December 2000, Col. Gbedemah vacated his post for a while. The document also comes down heavily on the corruption associated with the NDC government of Jerry Rawlings and gives the indication that the Western diplomatic missions in Accra were aware of the corruption and briefed their governments regularly.

Military procurement is one of the most lucrative aspects of government business, making money for both suppliers and buyers, sometimes in the most dishonourable of fashions. In the last parliament, the issue of auditing military expenditure came up for debate but ended inconclusively. Because of the fear of coup d'etats, African governments more or less turn blind eyes and deaf ears to happenings in the military, allowing individuals to get away with debilitating corrupt activities.

Please read the following bombshell: Bonn. 2nd December 1999
The Military Attache
Ghana High Commission
13 Belgrave Square
London SW 1X8PN Great Britain


Dear Sir,
Activities against Ghana's Reputation and Security As a participant of a confidential meeting between officials of three German ministries and the BND (German intelligence service) I became a witness of a story, which more or less should be valued as the result of the unhealthy desire for admiration of a sub-normal German military attache.

Nevertheless such an affair can easily create damages, and in this case I think it already has. Subject to this conference was the report of a certain Oberstleutnant (Lt. Col.) Wiedemann about corruption within the Ghana Armed Forces in connection with the German truck-producer Mercedes- Benz.

This Oberstleutnant Wiedemann, as I learned, is the German military attache in Accra. Purpose of that meeting was to keep us (the official Germany) out of a possible public discussion. (Because this days there are so many also international cases of corruption in connection with German companies.)

His information, as Wiedemann states in his report, he received from within the Ghana Armed Forces as well as from Mercedes-Benz representatives in Tema and Accra. The one in Accra, according to the report, has actually only to do with Mercedes-limousines and is a Lebanese businessman. His name was not mentioned in the report.

His importance that Lebanese gains from the fact, as Wiedemann writes, that since many years he bribes a wide range of Ghanaian officials, among others some senior army officers. Those facts were important to establish similar precious ("wertvolle") contacts between the Ghana Armed Forces and the utility vehicle and truck-branch of Mercedes-Benz.

This branch is said to be located in a city called Tema. There in Tema a certain Mr. Axmann (or Achsmann?) is another informer or spy of the German military attache.

Although this Mr. Axmann (respective Achsmann) seems to be well informed, the more important people on behalf of Mercedes-Benz are the Abidjan-representative of the company Mr. York von Schultzendorff (known gentry) and the one in charge for that intended deal, the Stuttgart-based Mr. Nigiri (as I understood the name).

Mr. von Schultzendorff and Mr. Nigiri were both present when a certain Lt. Col. Timothy Mbro (that's how the name was spelled) visited Stuttgart for the necessary "tests" of the suitable trucks wanted by the Ghana Armed Forces.

In connection with this tests respectively in connection with former experiences concerning the wanted Mercedes- trucks Wiedemann's report (read aloud by the representative of the BND) was also in the position to surprise the audience with a copy of that official Ghanaian letter (official letter-head), in which the Mercedes- trucks were described as better than the today's trucks of the Ghana Armed Forces.

In connection with this expert opinion the trucks of the Steyr company were explicitly mentioned (by the letter himself or by Wiedemann).

The fact that even before those "tests" the Mercedes-Benz trucks are described as the better trucks for Wiedemann and some people within the audience is a clear indication as well as a confirmation for the analogous statements of the various Mercedes-representatives that allowes that German military attache to arrive at the conclusion that "those notorious underpaid senior officers" ("diese notorisch unterbezahlten hoheren Offiziere") are bribed bei Mercedes-Benz.

Lt. Col. Timothy Mbro is the first Ghanaian officer Wiedemann describes as bribed. Another one is Col. W. A. Gbedemah (spelled like this) of a certain Burma-Camp ("Burma" like the country in Asia).

According to Wiedemann's report Col. Gbedemah is in charge of the truck-deal. In the above mentioned official letter of the Ghana Government the wish to get Mercedes-trucks is word for word described as "choice of the decision-makers" in Ghana.

The types of Mercedes-trucks we are talking about are the 1117A and the 1222A. The 1117A is referred to command build-ups and perhaps other build-ups, the 1222A is mainly or even exclusively seen in his troup carrying version. The quantity was mentioned as from thirty to thirty- five (30-35) although unfortunately I can't get out of my memorandum whether this quantity if relevant to both types or just to t he 1117A next to which I had noted it.

The consultant for the deal is named as Global Strategic Ventures Ltd., based in a part of Accra called Airport Area. The street sounds Scandinavian like Knudsfal (Kundsfal) Avenue. In charge on this side would be a certain Mr. Svarikies (or Sranikies). Behind that consultant company a certain Admiral Hansen (or Hanson) is said to hold the strings in his hand. The Admiral may also be an "Admiral rtd."

The contacts between the Ghana Armed Forces and Mercedes-Benz are supposed to have started on January 1997. As Wiedemann got to know from one of his spies, Mercedes-Benz already thought of "alternatives" in case they would be confronted with the kind of problems you must expect if you intend to export military goods from Germany.

Therefore as a precaution even the old and trusted connections from the days of Apartheid in South Africa were again taken into consideration: the connections between Mercedes-South Afrika and Mercedes-Ivory Coast.

At last the Commander of the Ghana Armed Forces himself was called a payee of Mercedes-Benz by Oberstleunant Wiedemann's report.

The very problem the representative of the BND had to face after he finished reading, was that by far not everyone within the audience believed what he was forced to hear before. The reason is simple (but of course nobody said this!):

People with at least a minimum of experience in German public affairs always have to realize that most of the "knowledge" which originates either from the BND or from the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) you better forget about.

The main job of both organizations is to find their position in the so called "new world after the Cold War". It makes this job not easier for them that during the Cold War they also searched for such a position and, of course did not find it. This is common knowledge in Germany.

And it is also common knowledge that the position of a military attache in the today Germany for the Bundeswehr is more or less nothing else than "a storeroom for empty bottles". If in Germany you want to get rid of a useless officer, then make him a military attache.

Of course does such a military attache know (or at least feel) how his comrades and the other sectors of the administration think about him. The result is that he tries very hard to lift himself in a position of some importance. The medium for that are "important informations."

Similar problems, as said before, does also bring the BND about to "surprise" the astonished mankind from time to time with the fabulous results of his "work". To cut it short: it's not a contingency and only logical that the intelligence service of the former East Germany had the BND totally under his control!

The BND representative might have elicited those manifold thoughts of the audience and so brought "heavy" support into the discussion: We (the audience) should not take it the easy way and only recognize in this report something like a further attempt to give themselves (the BND) a new acknowledgement of legitimacy by "discovering Africa again" (indem wir Africa new entdecken).

That he (the BND representative) had told us before would not only be the result of Wiedemann's work. Before coming here, we discussed it with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and "our American friends" (the US Intelligence Service).

One of the representatives of the German Foreign Office was at variance with that comment. About a planed truck-deal their ambassador in Accra, a certain Mr. Nakonz, did not know anything. The only thing in that context he regularly reports about are the various forms of corruption in Ghana.

But this would mainly concern cases of corruption outside the armed forces. For example, a former German manager of a Ghana/Swiss building company who was forced to leave the country years ago from time to time asks the embassy in Accra, "to do something for him" so that he could go back to Ghana.

This German also tried himself "to do something", so he contacted a Ghanaian officer responsible for the security of the Ghana Government, Col. Kojo Tsikata (as spelled), and years before also in charge of his case.

This officer, as Ambassador Nakonz reportet, told the German manager that there would be only a chance for him to return to Ghana, if he, the German, would build him, the officer, a big house free of charge.

I took this example, because the name of the Colonel will appear again when it comes to the American part of this story.

The representative of the Foreign Office brought some other examples of corruption within the Ghana administration which unfortunately is not that easy for me to repeat, because I simply don't know enough about the special situation in Ghana and within it's government. Only very few names I could bring together with their official function.

And one of them is the name of the Colonel. Thank's to the German Ambassador to Ghana. In one of his reports, the representative of the Foreign Office among others quoted, he calls the Colonel "a rogue in waiting" ("ein Schurke in Wartestellung"), who did not even hesitate to kill some independent judges who refused to close their eyes in view of his many crimes. Before the unification of Germany the Colonel is also said to have launched a false, compromising report of the West-German embassy in which you could find constructed lies about CIA-activities in Ghana.

For the Colonel, an alleged Marxist, and his people in the Ghana Government the end of the Eastern Block and the victory of the (so called) Free Market must have been an incredible shock. But their should be no doubt: If the economic situation in Ghana worsens, their hour will come again.

On a (kind of) list, on which the Ghana officials are divided in "friendly" and "unfriendly" personalities within the Ghana administration the Colonel obviously is the leading one of the "unfriendly" ones. Thanks to the combined work of German Embassy, BND and Americans! Concerning the truck-deal the Americans seemed to be reluctant to show up a clear position. Since Mercedez-Benz became DaimlerChrysler they are of course interested in the welfare of this combine.

And they share the opinion of their German (at least intelligence-) partners, that it cannot be wrong to have one's food inside the armed forces of a "shifty fellow" ("unsicherer Kantonist").

On the other side they claim to have also their special experiences with the Ghanaians. And in their opinion this experiences are more worse than the ones of the Germans. It seems that they are not unhappy with the today situation in Ghana and they try hard to leave it like that.

Like the military-attache also the German ambassador is using two types of informers or spies: One type takes money, the other type does not. Apart from the above mentioned one the Lebanese community in Ghana generally seems to do a good job for Germans and Americans. Probably because they have their accounts also here in Germany and in the USA.

Anything substantial for my ministry I not really got to hear at that meeting. Instead of facts we could work on we got rumours and presumptions.

The question whether Mercedes-Benz already committed or intends to commit an offence seemed not to be interesting! Real facts were not available.

Like my colleague said after the meeting: "Aus der Ecke Bundeswehr und BND kommt immer nur Scheise!" ("From Bundeswehr and BND you always get nothing than shit!").

Please, Sir, keep sufficient space between you (the Ghana Armed Forces) and the German military-attache Wiedermann. Be also cautious if you meet anyone from the German Embassy.

Some Germans are still searching for their position in the world. And the position they already might have in mind must not be the best of all thinkable positions. Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!

PS: As soon as I have found out whether and to which address in Accra I can send Col. Tsikata a copy of this letter I will do that.