I decided to purchase a copy of Dr Arthur Kennedy’s book to find out what the entire furore had been about. The book is largely a recount of his experiences as part of Nana Akufo Addo’s presidential campaign and his input into a campaign that narrowly failed to retain power for the NPP.

Throughout the book, one can see that Dr Kennedy is influenced to a large extent by US political practices. This can be seen from the quotations he uses at the beginning of each chapter and the justifications he gives for some of the recommendations he made to the Akufo Addo campaign. The American influence is so pervading that in quoting from Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of blood’ speech, he described him as an American Conservative Politician instead of a British one. Enoch Powell’s speech in 1968 was considered racist and no one, certainly in Britain, would consciously quote from it. It was a speech that finished Powell off as a politician.

The objectives he gives for writing the book are stated as:

1. Offering a respectable literature and reference for practising politicians on politics in Ghana;

2. Setting the record straight by displacing the misinformation that was filling the vacuum created by lack of information from the just ended campaign; and

3. Hoping to encourage people with first-hand experience of political events to write.

In the initial pages of the book, he admits that he was not witness to all the events he was writing about. In fact he had to fill in his knowledge by speaking to other people. He thus has to accept that some of his account is second-hand and this is a limitation that he ought to acknowledge or concede. He was also conscious of the fact that some in the party may see his action as washing the party’s dirty linen in public. Despite the risk of this impression, he still wanted to prevent others from filling the space with lies; thus he had to embark on this enterprise.

He devoted a chapter each to the state of the party and the nation. In my view this review lacked depth, was not analytical and was rushed. The mention of Maxwell Kofi Jumah and how he introduced President Kuffour in New York was out of context. These chapters did not have the same authority as when he talked about the campaign in which he was one of the principal actors. He enumerated government achievements on the economy, education, health, infrastructural development and press freedom but tempered it with several ‘dark clouds on the horizon’, among which were:

• The government not fighting corruption with the same vigour as it began, claiming that by 2008 many considered the vim as having gone out of the government’s anti-corruption drive;

• Ministers and functionaries who grew too big in their shoes. In this instance, he referred to the reported behaviour of some MCEs and DCEs; and, among ministers, the behaviour of Hon. Asamoah Boateng (Asabee); • The government’s inability to create enough jobs to fill people’s pockets despite improvements in the economy;

• The perception of soaring crime rate, despite the increase in police numbers;

• Presidential primaries, whose display of opulence offended the sensibilities of many; and

• Acrimonious parliamentary primaries that left the party divided. On the question of why the party failed to retain power, Dr Kennedy summed the reasons under two headings:

• Failure to police the vote on election day; and

• Systemic failures, which he identified as:

o Mistakes in government;

o Mistakes in the party; and

o Mistakes in the campaign

On the whole, the book ought to be useful and informative to all political parties and campaigns in terms of:

• How to run and control presidential campaigns in Ghana;

• The strategies to adopt whether your party is in power or in opposition;

• The need to leave a vanguard of seasoned operatives at party HQ when forming a government;

• How a party in power should interact with its President and the Presidency; and

• Having a clear objective on selecting a running mate - either to enhance the ticket or for governance reasons, after winning the election.

Dr Kennedy’s book did not provide sufficient treatment of these issues but he draws attention to the problems these could create if not adequately addressed. He paints the picture of a party structure that was denied the talent that successfully won previous elections due to disagreements between the party and the President. This he opined affected operations at party headquarters and handicapped the party during the election campaign.

Another tension that Dr Kennedy wrote about was that between the candidate’s campaign team and the already-existent party structures. In my view this tension will always exist and parties would have to manage it. A presidential candidate will see an election campaign as a fight to actualise a personal ambition and would like to have some control over its course and direction. A political party, on the other hand, would see the campaign as a collective enterprise to win power for the party.

He also points to the tension that existed between the President/Presidency and the party. He mentions the recommendation he made to the campaign to distance itself from some policies of the Kuffour government, particularly the building of the Jubilee House and the intention to purchase presidential jets. Here too, one can see the US influence coming to the fore where he justifies this on the basis of George W Bush distancing himself from the Republican Congress when he was running for the US presidency. The circumstances though were not the same. George Bush was Governor of Texas and not a Congressman. He could not therefore be held responsible for any policy inadequacies of the then Republican-led Congress. In fact US politicians outside the Washington beltway always fight elections on the promise to go there to break the logjam. If Bush had been a Congressman, whose voting record on issues could be verified, he could not have got away from making what Dr Kennedy termed as “pragmatic separation” from the Republican Congress. On this score, I think Nana Akufo-Addo got it right by not distancing himself from the collective responsibility of the cabinet. A realisation that perhaps ought to dawn on Dr Kennedy and political parties in general is that a President fighting re-election is different from one completing his second and last term in office. Whilst a President enters the presidency as a partisan politician he leaves as a statesman. Rawlings is an exception in our Ghanaian case. A second-term President cares more about the legacy he leaves behind and how history will judge him. He also has to be careful not to overshadow his party’s candidate. He thus has to take instructions from the campaign as to how, when and where he is deployed. After reading the book, I asked myself the reasons for the furore that has greeted such a well-intentioned book. My own view is that it is more to do with the title: Chasing the Elephant into the Bush: the Politics of Complacency, which probably bears limited relation to the contents of the book. I can imagine Dr Kennedy’s party colleagues seething at the fact that he borrowed an NDC slogan as the title to a book written by their own party man. It is also difficult to discern from the contents where complacency was acted out by the party, apart from the party’s unwillingness to contemplate a second round and hence not planning for it. I will term this as ‘irrational confidence’ rather than complacency. Dr Kennedy’s account paints the picture of candidate who was going to bed late and waking up early to campaign. He also pointed to a candidate who was meticulous in going over written speeches and rehearsing for debates. This is not the mark of complacency.

Another source of controversy is the disclosure of some conversations which were probably meant to be kept in confidence; and his narration about the conduct of some in the campaign (especially Nana Akufo Addo’s family), which showed them in bad light. Lastly, Dr Kennedy made the conscious decision to protect some names in some instances, and in other instances, decided to name the actors. It is not clear what formula was at play in this decision.

Dr Kennedy’s most potent advice to governments is that at times good policies do not make good politics and that this should guide the conduct of government in an election year. This may be sound advice but he should have heeded his own advice when writing the book. He should have known that at times disclosure of party information (especially the embarrassing ones) does not smart politics make. He should have been mindful of his audience – the entire Ghanaian electorate. He should therefore have avoided some of the revelations, which if not disclosed, would not have harmed the intent of the book; but with their disclosure have embarrassed some in the party. Some of the disclosures have handed their opponents ammunition and may potentially lead to the straining of relationships between some party bigwigs (an example being that between Dr Apraku and Obetsebi Lamptey). This could defeat Dr Kennedy’s aim of calling for a united party to win the 2012 elections.

Reading the book, I get the impression that Dr Kennedy saw his own role as being near perfect and without any flaws. He was much laboured in accepting some responsibility for the defeat. What he accepted was in the last few pages of the book and was limited to only administrative/operational slip ups. This was his first time of serving as the communications Director of a presidential campaign. It is natural to expect that he would have had some personal ‘snafoos’ whose recount would have helped soothed some bruised egos. The crowded field of presidential aspirants was certainly one of the contributory factors to the NPP defeat. It would have been sincere on his part to at least acknowledge his own role in this.

On the building of the Jubilee house and the presidential jets, it may be too soon to make judgements on them. As we say, the jury is still out, especially when we have in recent weeks and months read about the NDC government ordering jets to replace those used by the Airforce; and the Osu Castle being threatened by sea erosion. The foreword by Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo is dated 24th June 2009, implying that the book might have been written not long after the narrow defeat when perhaps emotions were still too raw.

In conclusion, I will say that the NPP should pick their way through Dr Kennedy’s book to learn about some of the challenges that faced them in 2008 and to rectify them. They should also heed some of the fine pieces of advice given by Dr Kennedy. With regards to the performance and achievements of the Kuffour government, they should leave history to be the better judge.

On Dr Kennedy’s side, I will urge him to tinge his knowledge of US politics with some knowledge about issues and actions that shape contemporary Ghanaian politics. He should work hard to mend fences with his colleagues and offer some grudging apologies where personal embarrassment has ensued. He has succeeded in making his points but I think he is aware that his party cannot afford to be divided. Above all, I sincerely hope that he still harbours the ambition to be the NPP flagbearer one day, in which case he would not want to be remembered as having contributed to divisions in the party.

Dr Frank Yaw Ohemeng

Manchester, UK