The Report of Investigation into alleged Commission of Corruption and Corruption-related offences involving Charles Adu Boahen dated 30 October 2023 and signed by Kissi Agyebeng, the Special Prosecutor is bogus and fraudulent.

The report does not meet the rudimentary standards, ethics, and principles of “considering the facts and evidence gathered from an investigation, to take a decision whether or not to prosecute” under Regulation 11 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Regulations, 2017 (L.I. 2374).

The discretion of the Attorney -General, and the Special Prosecute who drives his delegated authority from him whether or not to prosecute is rarely the subject of media publicity for settled ethical reasons, nor is there a law requiring him to state for public consumption the reasons for the exercise of the discretion. Kissi Agyebeng, the Media Special Prosecutor, has chosen to do so, and he must, therefore, be held strictly to account based on his own report.

But the timing of the publication of the OSP Charles Adu Boahen Report only five (5) days before the New Patriotic Party’s 4 November 2024 presidential primaries also raises genuine concerns of covertly using the OSP for internal political party electioneering purposes.

The decision to prosecute:

The Attorney-General's department:

Writing an opinion on whether or not to prosecute based on facts and evidence gathered from an investigation is governed by the settled tradecraft of investigators and prosecutors in law enforcement agencies in Ghana. They derive from the exercise of delegated authority from the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial powers under Article 88(3) and (4) of the 1992 Constitution.

All police dockets received in the Office of the Attorney-General from the Director-General CID are as a matter of procedure referred by the Attorney-General (AG) directly to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) or through the Deputy Attorney-General (DAG).

The DPP may in turn refer the docket to a group Chief State Attorney (CSA) heading the particular subject matter for further action. The CSA may in turn refer the docket to a Principal State Attorney (PSA) and his group to study and to bring up an opinion to which the CSA endorses, adds to, or rewrites, and finalizes an opinion to the DPP.

The DPP may agree with the group opinion of the CSA and his team or add his final opinion for submission directly or through the DAG to the AG for his final action. The prosecutorial opinions from each Attorney in the DPP’s office from an Assistant State Attorney (ASS) through a State Attorney (SA), a Senior State Attorney (SSA), PSA, to the group CSA stating the facts, the evidence, the offence or offences suspected to have been committed, an analysis of the ingredients of the offence(s) suspected to have been committed, the case law, and justification derived from the analysis of those materials why there is
reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed and the degree of certainty that a prosecution may or may not succeed.

By the time an ASS becomes an SA and then an SSA he would have internalized the processes and procedures for writing prosecutorial opinions under the supervision of his supervising PSA, CSA, and the DPP. A diligent DAG and AG is able to determine the quality of work of each Attorney from the opinions on cases on a police docket which eventually get to his desk.

The AG or DAG if they agree with the office of the DPP’s decision to prosecute or close the docket will endorse their agreement on the docket with such further directives to the DPP as deemed fit to convey to the Director-General CID for his further action. Where the AG or the DAG disagrees with the opinion of the DPP’s office he overrules the opinion set forth in writing his legal reasons and justifications based on the facts, evidence, and the law the considered opinion of the AG and directs the DPP to convey the AG’s final opinion to the
Director General CID to charge the suspect and return the docket for prosecution or to close the docket, as the case may be.

The same procedures apply in the regional office of the Attorney General except that the Attorney responsible for the region and his team have been ceded a lot of discretion and transmit police dockets to head office only upon standing instructions when directed to, or upon the exigencies of particular cases. The procedure is not a one-man show.

The office of the Special Prosecutor:

As a young law enforcement agency being operationalized the primary objective of the OSP in its transition was to build consensus amongst the investigating and prosecuting staff under the leadership of the Special Prosecutor. The procedure adopted at the OSP under my watch, therefore, gave investigators and prosecutors working on particular investigations the right to submit preliminary opinions on whether or not to prosecute as part of their recommendations to the Special Prosecutor under Regulation 10 of L.I. 2374 through the Deputy Special
Prosecutor.

The OSP used experienced seconded police investigators and a CSA and SSA
seconded from the AG’s Department as prosecutors. The need for a fiat from the AG to prosecute the OSP’s cases did not, therefore, arise. The Special Prosecutor studied the docket, made a tentative pre-charging decision, engaged
the investigators, prosecutor, or prosecutors handling the case, and the Deputy Special Prosecutor to discuss his opinion, and took the final decision whether or not to prosecute. The charges to be preferred if a decision to prosecute was made, was drafted, discussed through the same procedure, and finalized for signature by the Special Prosecutor.

Consequently, no investigator or prosecutor handling the OSP’s prosecution in court could disown the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute. The purpose was to create ownership of the results of the investigations and the prosecutorial decision by the authorized officers involved. Prosecutorial decision making whether or not to prosecute is thus an art governed by settled
rules guiding investigators and prosecutors grounded on rigorous tradecraft, and best practice, and not based on the whims and caprices of novices to the art of investigations and prosecutions.

It insulates the AG or the Special Prosecutor from charges of conflict of interest, partiality, and dictatorship, and guarantees the independence of the office.

The facts in the OSP's Charles Adu Boahene report:

The facts are narrated in the findings of the OSP’s Charles Adu Boahen Report in paragraphs 6.1 to 6.18. In or about March 2017 Ahmed Hussein Suale, an operative of Tiger Eye P.I. commenced the processes leading up to the Tiger Eye P.I. investigation in Dubai in February 2018. In the words of the report: “Tiger Eye P.I. commenced an investigation in 2017 in respect of Charles Adu Boahen, who was then a Deputy Minister of Finance.” The investigation was, thus, not premised on the biological origins of Charles Adu Boahen or his parentage, but on him as an adult, a public officer, and a Deputy Minister of Finance responsible for the natural and probable consequences of his own acts.

The facts tell the reader that: “... the investigative journalist .... was shot to death in January 2019 in Accra, Ahmed Hussein Suale, an operative of Tiger Eye P.I....” The Special Prosecutor’s narrative of the facts states that Mr. Adu Boahen eventually agreed to meet with, “the sheikh”, the supposed representative of the Al Baraka Banking Group in Dubai by taking a brief detour to Dubai on his way to Singapore on official government business.

This was in February 2018 when he met one Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and
Solomon Amponsah at the Dubai airport and by the undercover agents and taken to a hotel where two meetings took place at the hotel. At the second meeting, the supposed wealthy sheikh expressed his desire to invest about half a billion United States dollars in Africa and indicated that Ghana was one of the
countries of preferred interest in which he wanted to be connected to persons of the highest political influence for the purpose of establishing his business footprint.

Mr. Adu Boahen, intending to assure the supposed sheikh of his political office, influence, and connections, launched into his family history about his father, the relationship between the President and his father, his close ties to the President, which is akin to an uncle and nephew relationship, and his close affinity to the Vice President. The supposed sheikh picked up on Mr. Adu
Boahen’s assurances of the comfort of his high political influence and connections, and he laid the cards of the whole purpose of the sting operation on the table by enquiring as to the percentage cut Mr. Adu Boahen would take in respect of the intended investment in the financial sector in Ghana. After a bit of hesitation, Mr. Adu Boahen, of his own volition, suggested twenty percent (20%) of the intended investment as his cut.

Mr. Adu Boahen, according to the Special Prosecutor’s narration of the facts stated that he thought the sheikh would reject the suggested percentage cut as too pricey. Upon further enquiry by the supposed sheikh as to any further required commitments to secure the proposed high political influence in Ghana, Mr. Adu Boahen suggested the prudence of the payment of an appearance fee of Two Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President, also a public officer.

The “sheikh” offered Mr. Adu Boahen Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00) in cash as shopping money. The “sheikh” placed the cash on a piece of furniture close to Mr. Adu Boahen, and he accepted and collected the cash with gratitude. The Special Prosecutor narrates that during the investigation, Mr. Adu Boahen stated that he politely accepted the cash gift in order not to offend the sensibility of a potential wealthy investor looking to invest half a billion United States dollars in Ghana.

The proceedings of the first and second meetings were secretly audio-visually recorded by the undercover agents in their entirety.

The salient facts and the ingredients of corruption offences:T

The salient facts of the Special Prosecutor’s own narrative of the facts above for purposes of a pre-charging decision are that Mr. Charles Adu Boahen was targeted by Tiger Eye P.I. through its investigative journalist Ahmed Hussein Suale in March 2017 by virtue of his public office of being “then a Deputy Minister of Finance”. Mr. Adu Boahen eventually agreed to meet with the supposed representatives of the Al Baraka Banking Group in Dubai by taking a brief detour to Dubai on his way to Singapore on official government business.

This was in February 2018 when he met one Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu and Solomon
Amponsah at the Dubai airport and by the undercover agents and taken to a hotel where two meetings took place. The “sheikh” laid the cards of the whole purpose of the sting operation on the table by enquiring as to the percentage cut Mr. Adu Boahen would take in respect of the intended investment in the financial sector in Ghana. After a bit of hesitation, Mr. Adu Boahen, on his own volition, suggested twenty percent (20%) of the intended investment in the financial
sector in which he was a Deputy Minister of Finance as his cut.

When the “sheikh” made further enquiries as to any required commitments to secure the proposed high political influence in Ghana, Mr. Adu Boahen suggested the prudence of the payment of an appearance fee of Two Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President, also a public officer. The proceedings of the first and second meetings were secretly audio-visually recorded by the undercover agents.

Examination and analysis of the OSP's salient facts and findings:

The salient facts from the Special Prosecutor’s report show that Mr. Charles Adu Boahen was targeted because he was the Deputy Minister of Finance, and he used public funds on official government business on his way to Singapore to briefly detour to Dubai for the meetings in February 2018. Mr. Adu Boahen offered and the sheikh agreed to pay him of his own volition, his suggested twenty percent (20%) of the intended investment in the financial sector in Ghana as his cut. After a successful encounter and meeting the “sheikh” offered Mr. Adu Boahen Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00) in cash as shopping money
which he accepted and collected with gratitude.

On the “sheikh’” enquiry as to any further required commitments to secure the proposed high political influence in Ghana, Mr Adu Boahen suggested the prudence of the payment of an appearance fee of Two Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President, a public officer.

Charles Adu Boahen’s motives and thinking that his acceptance of his suggested twenty percent (20%) cut for the intended investment in the financial sector in Ghana are irrelevant in deciding whether or not to prosecute any experienced prosecutor without malicious and sinister ulterior intentions to skew the law in favour of the suspect or for a political agenda. Mr. Charles Adu Boahen’s pedigree and relationship with the President and the Vice President are also irrelevant to making a professional decision to prosecute or close an
investigation docket. Mr. Charles Adu Boahen on the Special Prosecutor’s own findings acted throughout on his own volition and as a Deputy Minister of Finance on state assignment funded from the public purse.

The Special Prosecutor brings this out beyond dispute when he stated in paragraph 6.15, inter alia that: “6.15 In the high political office he occupied, it ought reasonably to have occurred to Mr. Adu Boahen that his bargain for twenty percent (20%) of the value of the proposed investment and his receipt of a cash gift of Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00) from the
supposed sheikh was outrightly improper. Mr. Adu Boahen exhibited a lack of sound judgment.

.... All the indices point to the conclusion that Mr. Adu Boahen’s principal motivation was his own personal gain though he intimated to the supposed sheikh that he was driven by the potential developmental benefits to Ghana of the proposed investment”.

The professional prosecutor who arrives at the above conclusions on the facts, the evidence, and the law cannot without any further convincing legal arguments and justification leap into the next paragraph, 6.16 with the findings and conclusion the Special Prosecutor made. Kissi Agyebeng stated in paragraph 6.16 without any argumentation and legal justification based on the ingredients of trading in influence or influence peddling as foreign offences that: “6.16 The conduct of Mr. Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or influence peddling.
This is the practice of using one’s influence or connections in public office or with persons in public office to obtain favours or preferential treatment for oneself or another person, usually in return for payment. These acts have not been specifically prohibited in our jurisdiction as crimes per se.

However, they are gravely frowned upon and punishable as crimes in some jurisdictions. This is because such acts are closely associated with corruption
offences like using public office for profit and they also form the building blocks of general corruption. Then again, since they are closely associated with corruption, they have the effect of delegitimising democratic governance.”
The foregoing examination and analysis disclose corruption offences under Sections 239 and 179C of Act 29 suspected to have been committed upon the evidence. The OSP Charles Adu Boahen Report has, however, been published to the whole world and it is imperative that Kissi Agyebeng is not allowed to paint law enforcement and criminal justice administration in Ghana as a tradecraft without rules, principles, and guidelines that allow prosecutors to exercise arbitrary, capricious, and opaque discretion in the decision whether or not to prosecute.

Corruption by a public officer and abuse of public office:

Charles Adu Boahen:

The fact that a public officer has used or permitted his conduct to be influenced to commit a corruption offence does not turn the crime into trading in influence or influence peddling under the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) and listed under Section 79 of Act 959 as a corruption or corruption-related offence. Section 239 of Act 29 creating the offence of “corruption of and by public officer” states that: “Section 239. Corruption of and by the public officer

A public officer or juror who commits corruption, wilful oppression, or
extortion, in respect of the duties of his office, commits a misdemeanour.

A person who corrupts any other person in respect of duty as a public officer or a juror commits a misdemeanour.”

Section 240 of Act 29 explains “corruption by public officers”. It states:
“Section 240. Explanation as to corruption by public officers

A public officer, juror, or voter commits corruption in respect of the duties of office or the vote, if the public officer, juror or voter directly or indirectly, agrees or offers to permit the conduct of that person as a public officer, juror, or voter to be influenced by the gift, promise or prospect of a valuable consideration to be received by that person, or by any other person, from any other person.” (Emphasis supplied).

Firstly, Mr. Charles Adu Boahen fits squarely into the above explanation in several categories as a person who acted at all material times relevant to this case as a public officer who directly or indirectly agreed or offered to permit his conduct as a public officer to be influenced by the gift, promise or prospect of a valuable consideration to be received by him or by any other person. The 20% agreed cut falls within the category of directly agreeing and
offering to permit his conduct as a public officer to be influenced by the prospect of a valuable consideration to be received by him.

Secondly, Mr. Charles Adu Boahen was also a public officer who in respect of the duties of his office directly agreed and received a cash gift of Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00) from the supposed sheikh which the Special Prosecutor found “was outrightly improper”: and that “Mr. Adu Boahen exhibited lack of sound judgment”. This also falls under the explanation of corruption by public officers under sections 239 and 240 of Act 29. Mr. Charles Adu Boahen further directly agreed to permit his conduct as a public officer to be influenced by the gift of Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00) from the “sheikh”.

Thirdly, Mr. Charles Adu Boahen corruptly agreed to a proposal for “the payment of an appearance fee of Two Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President”, a public officer. Sections 239 and 240 make it clear that a public officer commits the offence of corruption by a public officer in respect of the duties of his office if the public
officer directly or indirectly, agrees or offers to permit the conduct of that person as a public officer to be influenced by the promise or prospect of a valuable consideration to be received by any other person, from any other person. The offence was committed by Charles Adu Boahen.

The OSP Charles Adu Boahen Report, however, conspicuously does not contain the
results of any investigation and interrogation of the Vice President, Mahamudu Bawumia, as to the fact that Charles Adu Boahen was acting at his behest and with his knowledge. This makes the timing of the publication of the OSP report on 30 October 2023 problematic and politically suspicious.

Anas Aremeyaw Anas & Tiger Eye P.I.:

The Charles Adu Boahen investigative journalism investigation brings out the crucial issue of the sources of Anas Aremeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I.’s funding and whether they are agents of a State or foreign entities or derive their funding from their own resources. The facts and evidence narrated by the Special Prosecutor show the investment of huge resources in airfares, the hiring of hotel accommodation, the upkeep of the investigative journalists, and
the origins of the amount of Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00) as gifted to Charles Adu Boahen in order to entrap him.

I have argued previously that Anas Aremeyaw Anas is a covert agent of some state or foreign entity which he has consistently denied. Anas Aremeyaw Anas must, therefore, be making huge personal profits from the enterprise of investigative journalism to continue in the business of anti-corruption entrepreneurs. Anas Aremeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I. definitely committed the offence of corruption of a public officer by virtue of their business enterprise.

They may also fall within the category of private entrepreneurs acting in collaboration with a person holding a public office for the latter to corruptly abuse the public office for private profit, and for the sole disguised purpose of the collaborators to reap massive profit or benefit in their business.
Anas Aremeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I. from the facts and evidence of the OSP definitely committed the offence of corruption of a public officer, Charles Adu Boahen, under Section 239(2) of Act 29. Kissi Agyebeng, therefore abused his public office for private benefit in attempting to save his mentor, friend and law partner, Anas Aremeyaw from possible prosecution with his bogus and fraudulent OSP Charles Adu Boahen Report.

I have quoted Section 239(2) of Act 29 above already. Section 241 of Act 29 explains the corruption of a public officer as follows:

“Section 241. Explanation as to corruption of public officer

A person commits the offence of corrupting a public officer, juror, or voter in respect of the duties of office or respect of the vote, if that person endeavours, directly or indirectly, to influence the conduct of the public officer, juror or voter in respect of the duties of office or respect of the vote, by gift, promise or prospect of a valuable consideration to be received by the public officer, juror, or voter, or by any other person, from any other person.” (Emphasis supplied)

The facts and evidence are that Anas Aremeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I. endeavoured directly to influence the conduct of Charles Adu Boahen, a Deputy Minister of Finance, a public officer, in respect of the duties of his office by gift, promise or prospect of valuable consideration to be received by Charles Adu Boahen the public officer or by the Vice President from Adu Boahen or the Sheik as any other person. This was done purely for commercial and business profit. The proper and appropriate rendition of the ingredients of the
offence is to be reflected on the charge sheet to be drawn up for the prosecution of Anas Aremeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I.

Using public office for profit:

The Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) contains in Chapter Four, “Special Offences” created (by the regime of President Jerry John Rawlings in 1993 when I was the Deputy Attorney-General) under section 3 of the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1993 (Act 458) inserting sections 179A, 179B, 179C, and 179D as Chapter Four of Act 29. Section 179C created the Special Offence of using public office for profit which states that:

“Section 179C Using public office for profit

A person commits a criminal offence who

While holding a public office corruptly or dishonestly abuses the office for private profit or benefit; or

Not being a holder of a public office act or is found to have acted in collaboration with a person holding a public officer for the latter to corruptly or dishonestly abuse the public office for private profit or benefit.”

Firstly, Charles Adu Boahen was at all material times of the offence reported holding a public office as a Deputy Minister of Finance who corruptly abused the office for private benefit.

Secondly, Anas Aremeyaw Anas as the alter ego for Tiger Eye P.I. falls within the category of not being a holder of a public office acted or was found by the facts reported to have acted in collaboration with Charles Adu Boahen, a holder of a public office for the latter to corruptly abuse the public office for private benefit. Anas Aremeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I. acted purely as entrepreneurs for their own benefit.

The Special Prosecutor, sensing that if he presented a rigorous analysis of the facts, evidence gathered during the investigation of Charles Adu Boahen’s corruption investigation, and the law he could not without justification conclude that the corruption offences of corruption of a public officer under Section 239 of Act 29 and/or using public office for profit under Section 179C of Act 29 had not been committed by Charles Adu Boahen, and by Aanas
Aremeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I. presented a bogus report The giver and the taker are both culpable in the offences of bribery and corruption.

The foregoing explains the bogus and fraudulent Charles Adu Boahen Report served to the public on 30 October 2023 by Kissi Agyebeng, the Special Prosecutor of the OSP only five (5) days to the NPP 4 November 2023 internal elections.

Kissi Agyebeng's conflict of interest:

The events giving rise to the presidential referral of the Charles Adu Boahen case to the Special Prosecutor, Kissi Agyebeng for investigation from the findings of the Special Prosecutor took place between March 2017 and February 2018 through a Tiger Eye P.I. investigative journalism operation. Kissi Agyebeng during the period of the investigation and up to his appointment on 5 August 2021 as the Special Prosecutor was a partner with Anas Aremeyaw Anas in the law firm of Cromwell Gray, LLP founded by Anas Anas as the first partner and William Kissi Agyebeng as the second partner. Kissi Agyebeng and Cromwell Gray LPP in which Anas Aremeyaw Anas is a partner acted as the lawyers for Tiger Eye P.I.

Kissi Agyebeng was so invested in Tiger Eye P.I. and emotionally involved from 2017 to 2019 in its operations that upon the death of Ahmed Hussein Suale he granted an interview to Kofi TV in January 2019 in which he explained the modus operandi of Tiger Eye P.I. and called for the arrest of Kennedy Ohene Agyapong for suspected complicity in the murder.

See: Anas Aremeyaw Anas' lawyer questions why Ken Agyapong should be allowed to travel now:

Kissi Agyebeng’s interview with Kofi TV in the Twi language puts beyond doubt his relationship with Tiger Eye P.I., Anas Aremeyaw Anas, and the late Ahmed Hussein Suale which shows that as a Special Prosecutor, he suffers from a prohibitive conflict of interest as a public officer under Article 284 of the 1992 Constitution by “putting himself in a position where his personal interest conflicts with the performance of the functions of his office”.

The facts which Kissi Agyebeng narrated as part of the supposed OSP investigation into the Charles Adu Boahen case are so exact to the facts he narrated to his interviewer on Kofi TV on 17 January 2019 that one is left in grave doubt whether the facts were coming from the investigation by the OSP or from his personal memory as a participant in the events when he was a lawyer to Anas Armeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I.. Kissi Agyebeng is thus incorrigible
to have written and appended his signature to the OSP Charles Adu Boahen investigations as though he is an honest and impartial broker under Sections 4(1) and 14 (2) and (3) of Act 959.

Kissi Agyebeng’s inability to present the corruption offences suspected to have been committed by Charles Adu Boahen, and Anas Aremeyaw Anas under sections 239 and 179C of Act 29 were deliberately actuated and influenced by his conflict of interest which he was conscious of.

The Republic versus Kofi Nyantakyi and the mask:

On Tuesday, 8 November 2022 the Supreme Court presided over by Mr. Justice Baffoe- Bonnie granted an application for certiorari by Kwesi Nyantakyi quashing an order of High Court (Criminal Division 2), Accra permitting Anas Aremeyaw Anas to testify in camera as a prosecution witness in the criminal case of the Republic v Kwesi Nyantakyi & Another. The case was remitted back to the High Court with directives for the continuation of the trial in that court.

On 17 May 2023 the High Court after hearing counsel for both sides ruled that it was in the interest of justice that Anas Aremeyaw Anas was a principal witness in the determination of the case, and his identity was crucial to allow the accused to identify him and to be able to defend himself. The High Court ordered, inter alia, that: “Investigative journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas will testify against former GFA President Kwasi Nyantakyi in open court
but disguised in a mask. Mr. Nyantakyi will however have the opportunity to see his face in chambers before such testimony.”

The next day, 18 May 2023 Tiger Eye P.I. issued a press statement for and on behalf of Anas Aremeyaw Anas in which he refused to submit to the order of the court to unveil his identity to the accused and his counsel in chambers before his testimony in court, stating that “prudence requires that he declines the invitation to reveal his identity." The news report opined that:

“The trial itself was delayed because the key witness, Ahmed Suale was killed. The Attorney General thus has the option of compelling Anas to testify in which case they risk having him not cooperating when he mounts the box, dropping the case entirely or having another person testify.”

The Republic v Nyantakyi puts to rest the request made to the OSP on 4 July 2019 by Kissi Agyebeng’s letter as the lawyer for Anas Aremeyaw Anas and Tiger Eye P.I. in the Charles Bissue investigation that the only condition for his client to testify in court is to be masked throughout the proceedings as a prosecution witness. This letter and my response on or about 19 July 2019 are on file and the case docket in the OSP.

Kissi Agyebeng as a close confidant, law partner, and friend of Anas Armeyaw Anas knows from the foregoing that with the death of Ahmed Suale the main prosecution witness in the Charles Adu Boahen case, Anas Aremeyaw Anas who is the only surviving witness is not going to unmask in chambers before his testimony in court. In the circumstances, the only way to save the face of Anas Aremeyaw Anas and himself is to concoct reasons why Charles Adu Boahen cannot be prosecuted. The fact is that even if Kissi Agyebeng decided to prosecute Charles Adu Boahen, the OSP’s case would suffer the same fate as the Republic versus
Kofi Nyantakyi’s case.

Kissi Agyebeng’s refuge was to dishonestly manufacture trading in influence or influence peddling as the reason why he cannot prosecute Charles Adu Boahen.
This explains why he could not justify the conclusions of his decision whether or not to prosecute with cogent facts and legal arguments.

Killing two birds with one stone- Ingratiation with government:

Kissi Agyebeng was hoping that by presenting his bogus and fraudulent report on Charles Adu Boahen's alleged corruption investigation pretending to exonerate him under the guise of trading in influence and influence peddling instead of exploring the offences committed under Sections 239 and 179C of Act 29, he could look into the bottle with both eyes.

First, Kissi Agyebeng intended by his abuse of his public office in his bogus and fraudulent report to reap benefits from the Government by creating the perception that he exonerated Charles Adu Boahen.

Secondly, he intended to save Anas Aremeyaw Anas from being charged with a corruption offence of corruption of a public officer.

Thirdly, he was saving Anas Aremeyaw Anas’ face from having to refuse to give evidence.

Fourthly, Kissi Agyebeng was saving his own face by presenting a case before the High Court without a star witness.

Fifthly, he was deceiving the public that he was not actuated by an unconstitutional conflict of interest in personally being involved in the investigation, and writing and signing the report in his own hand in a matter in which he was personally conflicted. Lastly, by timing the publication of
OSP Charles Adu Boahen Report only five (5) days to the 4 November 2023 NPP internal elections he gives the appearance of covertly intending to influence the outcome of that election for a particular candidate.

The OSP Labianca report based on trading in influence:

Kissi Agyebeng in the OSP Labianca Report found that trading in influence or influence peddling constituted prosecutable corruption or corruption-related offences and was directed as follows:

“On 21 March 2022 the Special Prosecutor issued an interim directive to Labianca Company Limited to pay an amount of One Million Seventy-Four Thousand cedis Six Hundred and Twenty-Seven Cedis Fifteen pesewas (GHC1,074,627.15), representing the short collection or shortfall of revenue arising from the issuance of the unlawful customs advance ruling by the Deputy Commissioner for Customs in charge of operations, Mr. Joseph Adu Kyei into the Asset Recovery Account of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.”

The Special Prosecutor, Kissi Agyebeng who issued the Labianca Report under his signature made the following findings upon which he premised his directive in paragraph 5.1: “4.3 It would appear that the coincidence of the indicated applications and the public office appointments of Ms. Asomah-Hinneh was not altogether accidental. There is strong evidence to suggest that the events are a product of influence peddling.

4.4 Of special significance to the investigation is a joint application for the acceptance of values of frozen foods intended to be imported lodged at the Customs Division by Labianca and Rafano Frozen Foods Company Limited on 6 April 2021, two (2) months after the appointment of Mr. Adu Kyei as the Deputy Commissioner of the Customs Division in charge of operations.

4.33 The OSP finds that there is strong evidence to suggest that Mr. Adu Kyei’s decision to issue a customs advance ruling for the applicants was procured through influence peddling or trading of influence by Ms Asomah-Hinneh by employing her position as a member of the Council of State and a member of the Board of Directors of Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority.”

I had argued that in a critique of the OSP Labianca Report, there was no offence under Section 79 of Act 959 known as trading in influence or influence peddling upon which Kissi Agyebeng unlawfully and unconstitutionally founded his report and directed Labianca Company Limited to pay an amount of One Million Seventy-Four Thousand cedis Six Hundred and Twenty-Seven cedis Fifteen pesewas (GHC1,074,627.15), into the Asset Recovery Account of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

Kissi Agyebeng’s vault face in the Charles Adu Boahen Report means that he now admits that he acted unlawfully and unconstitutionally in the findings and penalties he imposed in the Labianca Report. Kissi Agyebeng and the OSP need to apologize to the victims of that investigation and the people of Ghana for that bogus and fraudulent report. Kissi Agyebeng must on this score return the amount paid by Labianca into the Asset Recovery Account of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to the Labainca Company Limited with interest from the date of payment to the date of return of the amount to the company.

Conclusions:

The foregoing examination and analysis of the OSP’s report have demonstrated that the Report of Investigation into Alleged Commission of Corruption and Corruption-Related Offences involving Charles Adu Boahen dated 30 October 2023 and signed by Kissi Agyebeng, the Special Prosecutor is bogus and fraudulent. The report does not meet the rudimentary standards, ethics, and principles of “considering the facts and evidence gathered from an investigation, to take a decision whether or not to prosecute” under Regulation 11 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Regulations, 2017 (L.I. 2374).

The examination and analysis of the report have also shown that the facts, evidence, and findings made by the Special Prosecutor support the commission of the corruption offences of corruption of and by public officers under Section 239 of Act 29 and using public office for profit under Section 179C of Act 29. It has also been shown that the Special Prosecutor cannot determine that trading in influence is not an offence in the Charles Adu Boahen Case when in the Labianca case he determined that trading in influence or influence peddling is a
corruption or corruption-related offence assumed jurisdiction and imposed a penalty or refund of One Million Seventy-Four Thousand cedis Six Hundred and Twenty-Seven cedis Fifteen pesewas (GHC1,074,627.15), paid into the Asset Recovery Account of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

The appearance that the OSP’s Charles Adu Boahen Report covertly intends to influence the outcome of the 4 November 2023 NPP internal elections for a particular candidate taints the independence and impartiality of the OSP under Kissi Agyebeng. The further actions contained in paragraphs 7.0 to 7.3 of the same report are mere smokescreens to deceive the public more and should be ignored with the contempt they deserve.

The professional ineptitude of Kissi Agyebeng, as the Special Prosecutor and his shameless conflict of interest have consistently led him into unlawful and unconstitutional conduct in abuse of his office as a public officer for personal benefit as demonstrated in this discourse in defence of the 1992 Constitution. The 1992 Constitution will be better served by Constitutional activists and human rights advocates taking steps to commence impeachment proceedings against such self-serving public officers.